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Debunking the “Critical 
Positivity Ratio” for 
Humanistic Psychology: 
Introduction to Special 
Issue
Harris L. Friedman1 and Nicholas J. L. Brown2
Abstract
An extraordinary claim was made by one of the leading researchers within 
positive psychology, namely, there is a universal–invariant ratio between 
positive to negative emotions that serves as a unique tipping point between 
flourishing and languishing in individuals, marriages, organizations, and 
other human systems across all cultures and times. Known as the “critical 
positivity ratio,” this finding was supposedly derived from the famous 
Lorenz equation in physics by using the mathematics of nonlinear dynamic 
systems, and was defined precisely as “2.9013.” This exact number was 
widely touted as a great discovery by many leaders of positive psychology, 
had tremendous impact in various applied areas of psychology, and, more 
broadly, and was extensively cited in both the scientific literature and in 
the global popular media. However, this finding has been demonstrated 
to be bogus. Since its advent as a relatively new subdiscipline, positive 
psychology has claimed superiority to its precursor, the subdiscipline of 
humanistic psychology, in terms of supposedly both using more rigorous 
science and avoiding popularizing nonsense. The debunking of the critical 
positivity ratio demonstrates that positive psychology did not live up to 
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these claims, and this has important implications, which are discussed in 
terms of “romantic scientism” and “voodoo science.” In addition, articles 
in the special issue on the “Implications of Debunking the ‘Critical Positivity 
Ratio’ for Humanistic Psychology” are introduced, as they also delve into 
these concerns.
Keywords
2.9013, critical positivity ratio, debunking, humanistic psychology, positive 
psychology, romantic scientism, voodoo science
Positive psychology emerged from humanistic psychology by promising to 
be more scientific than its predecessor, which its proponents soundly criti-
cized for its lack of scientific rigor. The dividing line between the two subdis-
ciplines of psychology was clearly drawn when Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 
(2000) extolled the alleged scientific advantages of positive psychology over 
humanistic psychology in their founding manifesto published in the American 
Psychologist, as follows:
Unfortunately, humanistic psychology did not attract much of a cumulative 
empirical base, and it spawned myriad therapeutic self-help movements. In 
some of its incarnations, it emphasized the self and encouraged a self-
centeredness that played down concerns for collective well-being. Further 
debate will determine whether this came about because Maslow and Rogers 
were ahead of their time, because these flaws were inherent in their original 
vision, or because of overly enthusiastic followers. However, one legacy of the 
humanism of the 1960s is prominently displayed in any large bookstore: The 
“psychology” section contains at least 10 shelves on crystal healing, 
aromatherapy, and reaching the inner child for every shelf of books that tries to 
uphold some scholarly standard.
Recently, however, positive psychology has had reasons to regret taking such 
a militant stance, as some of its most cherished findings have been shown to 
lack the scientific rigor on which it had staked its initial legitimacy as a new 
subdiscipline. Perhaps the most infamous of these is its claim to having found 
the “critical positivity ratio” (Fredrickson & Losada, 2005). In this claim, a 
highly specific number, 2.9013, was specified as being a universal–invariant 
“tipping point” (a term that has become widely popular, as in Gladwell, 2000), 
that distinguishes between “flourishing” and “languishing” across all sorts of 
human systems, including across cultures and time. This number was suppos-
edly based on the famous Lorenz equations from the discipline of physics, and 
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derived using the mathematics of nonlinear dynamic systems, which lent it 
great credence by association with these respected disciplines. It also was sup-
ported by a very small number of empirical studies of dubious worth. The ratio 
is computed by simply dividing the number of so-called positive to negative 
emotions, regardless of how those might be operationalized across various 
settings and times. The outrageous claim was made that a ratio equaling or 
exceeding the critical number of 2.9013 results in flourishing, at least suppos-
edly up to another critical point when it is speculated to switch directions—but 
that is another matter we do not address. This critical positivity ratio has been 
applied to businesses (e.g., Rego, Sousa, Marques, & Cunha, 2012), education 
(e.g., Norrish, Williams, O’Connor, & Robinson, 2013), health care systems 
(e.g., Gallan, Jarvis, Brown, & Bitner, 2013), marriages (e.g., Fincham & 
Beach, 2010), and many other human systems, including to individuals’ men-
tal health (e.g., Faulk, Gloria, & Steinhardt, 2013). Businesses that demon-
strate or exceed a ratio of 2.9013 positive to negative communications 
supposedly will have satisfied employees whose work will be successful, but 
businesses that fall below this ratio will be unproductive. Educational systems 
that demonstrate or exceed 2.9013 positive to negative communications 
between teachers and students supposedly will have successful learning out-
comes, but those that fall below this ratio will lead to academic failures. Health 
care systems that demonstrate or exceed 2.9013 positive to negative commu-
nications supposedly will have healthy patients, but those that fall below this 
ratio will worsen their patients’ illnesses. Marriages that demonstrate or 
exceed 2.9013 positive to negative communications supposedly will have 
contented partners with lasting relationships, but those that fall below this 
ratio will end in divorce. Individuals who demonstrate 2.9013 positive to neg-
ative self-talk will be happy, but those who fall below this ratio will be unhappy 
and even clinically depressed, and so forth.
The critical positivity ratio was widely touted as being the gem of positive 
psychology, and it went beyond an abstract claim into widespread applica-
tions. It spawned various industries, such as marriage counseling and organi-
zational consulting efforts aimed at getting people’s interactions over this 
so-claimed 2.9013 tipping point into flourishing (and, hence, outside of lan-
guishing) terrain. School intervention programs were designed to ensure that 
students received 2.9013 or more positive than negative communications 
from their teachers, as were health care systems relating to interactions 
between caregivers and patients. Business training courses were built around 
that same principle. Even the largest-ever applied social science research1 
program ever, the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program that trained liter-
ally every member of the U.S. Army, based its scientific legitimacy on this 
alleged finding (Jonas et al., 2010). Fredrickson and Losada’s (2005) article 
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on the discovery of the critical positivity ratio received more than 2,000 cita-
tions in the scholarly literature (retrieved from Google Scholar, April 15, 
2017), and this alleged finding was also covered in a best-selling popular 
book (Fredrickson, 2009) that garnered the strongest praise from many of the 
most well-known positive psychologists. On the book’s website, both 
Csikszentmihalyi and Seligman (see https://www.positivityratio.com/praise.
php), the co-founders of positive psychology, enthusiastically endorsed it. 
Seligman wrote,
The first time I heard Barb Fredrickson speak, the famous psychologist sitting 
next to me said, “That’s the real thing!” This book, like Barb, is the “Real 
Thing”: It’s the perfect blend of sound science and wise advice on how to 
become happier. Barbara Fredrickson is the genius of the positive psychology 
movement.
Csikszentmihalyi similarly wrote,
Written by one of the most influential contributors to this new perspective in 
science, Positivity provides a wonderful synthesis of what positive psychology 
has accomplished in the first decade of its existence. It is full of deep insights 
about human behavior, as well as useful suggestions for how to apply them in 
everyday life.
A parade of other stars from the positive psychology movement lined up on 
this website to genuflect at this remarkable 2.9013 finding and extoll the 
importance of this best-selling book.
Alas, however, we (along with our colleague, Alan Sokal) demonstrated 
that the critical positivity ratio is more than just problematic—it is nonsense 
(Brown, Sokal, & Friedman, 2013, 2014a). When findings in psychology are 
challenged, it often results in bitter debate over interpreting words and data, 
but this huge claim about the universal–invariant nature of the critical posi-
tivity ratio was based on mathematics—and in mathematics there are right 
and wrong answers that can be proven and disproven, as opposed to merely 
argued over, as psychologists are all too often used to doing when interpret-
ing empirical findings.
The problem is that the basis of the critical positivity ratio was mathemati-
cally misapplied, and hence is invalid (Brown et al., 2013). After much quib-
bling, including serious battles to even get our 2013 paper published, as it 
challenged a highly lauded finding, the flawed mathematics was finally 
acknowledged through Fredrickson and Losada’s (2013) retraction of the 
specific number and its underlying mathematics, withdrawing their remark-
able claim for 2.9013 as being a universal–invariant ratio.
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Fredrickson (2013b), however, continued to assert that there is ample 
empirical evidence for a tipping point somewhere around “3,” but we also 
showed that this claim is invalid (Brown et al., 2014a). Nevertheless, 
Fredrickson and many others in the positive psychology movement to this 
day do not acknowledge that their softened claim of an optimum ratio of 3 
positive to 1 negative emotions, presumably still universal and invariant, is 
nonsense, although this claim is no longer based on the withdrawn mathemat-
ics but, rather, on their (and others’) so-called empirical findings from an 
assortment of studies using widely varying methods.
It can easily be seen that even this softened claim is based on flawed rea-
soning, because it implicitly requires all experiences of emotion to have the 
same magnitude and duration to be comparable, which is absurd. A moment’s 
thought will show how impossible it is to actually measure a person’s experi-
ence of positive emotions on this basis. If someone laughs at a joke on TV, 
eats an ice-cream, sees their dog get run over, and watches a nice sunset, are 
they at a 3 to 1 ratio of positive to negative emotions and flourishing? And so 
it is with any comparison of emotions, as who can provide a value-free metric 
on which to draw any comparison in a universal–invariant way?
We discussed this problem in some depth elsewhere when looking at other 
approaches to emotions as conceptualized within positive psychology 
(Friedman & Brown, 2014). Sometimes such claims reach the level of 
extreme absurdity, as when Larsen (2009) decided that Fredrickson and 
Losada’s (2005) figure of 2.9013 could be rounded-up just a little further to a 
very important number in mathematics by suggesting this alleged tipping 
point should be viewed as the mathematical constant π. Arguing that there is 
a critical positivity ratio of 2.9013 based on flawed mathematics is bad 
enough, but arguing that it really is 3.14 without any justification is beyond 
our rational understanding.
Understanding Why Belief in the Critical Positivity 
Ratio Persists
Despite being debunked, the belief in the critical positivity ratio persists. 
Within separate chapters in the same book (Joseph, 2015), two differing con-
clusions about debunking the critical positivity ratio are drawn. Lewis (2015) 
wrote, “The statistical analysis on which this assertion is made has been ques-
tioned . . . and the debate rages as to the status of the finding” (p. 331), while 
Robbins (2015) wrote, “Simple formulations of well-being that may be 
seductive as abstract conceptions of happiness but are false and misleading, 
such as the critical positivity ratio” (p. 38). This divide represents the ongo-
ing controversy between those who are holding onto the false belief that 
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somewhere there is a critical positivity ratio and those who accept the debunk-
ing and its implications. Even though the mathematics for establishing 2.9013 
as a tipping point has been withdrawn by those who authored this extraordi-
nary claim, nevertheless belief in it lingers among many positive psychology 
adherents.
Perhaps this is partly due to the fact that, although she withdrew her claim 
for the existence of a universal–invariant number for the critical positivity 
ratio, Fredrickson (2013b) continued to claim there is empirical evidence for 
a tipping point somewhere around the ratio of 3 to 1. In our response to her 
continued claim of a ratio of around 3 to 1 existing, we showed that there was 
no empirical evidence whatsoever for any such tipping point, including the 
rounded-off number 3 or any other number (Brown et al., 2014a), let alone π 
as Larsen (2009) had proposed. We note that our rebuttal to her empirical 
claim was never refuted or even challenged.
Wishful Thinking, Romantic Scientism, and Voodoo Science
We included the term “wishful thinking” in the title of two of our articles on 
this topic (Brown et al., 2013, 2014a), and also discussed the implications of 
this in a summary paper (Brown, Sokal, & Friedman, 2014b) in which we 
described the critical positivity ratio as an example of “romantic scientism.” 
Simply put, the claim for the existence of a universal–invariant number com-
paring positive to negative emotions related to flourishing and languishing is 
simultaneously both thoroughly romantic, appealing to some naïve wish for 
complex human experience and behavior to be reduced to a simple formula 
(especially when rounded-up to π as Larsen, 2009, suggested), and thor-
oughly scientistic, appealing to the mathematics of nonlinear dynamic sys-
tems in a way that few psychologists can understand and that was completely 
misapplied. Hence, the errors made can be seen as a combination of scientism 
and romanticism that we call romantic scientism.
As the debunking of the critical positivity ratio was widely covered by the 
press (e.g., Anthony, 2014), it seems reasonable to expect this claim would 
have simply disappeared as part of science’s long history of discarded non-
sense. Yet acceptance of the validity of the critical positivity ratio persists, as 
there continue to be numerous citations that either ignore, or minimize the 
implications of, our debunking of this claim.
Why should this be? One way to understand this relates to so-called 
“voodoo science”2 (Charlton, 2008) and its resulting “zombie articles” 
(Neher, 2011), something one of us used previously to describe the contin-
ued citations giving credence to the critical positivity ratio (Friedman, 
2015b). Voodoo science is used to depict various scientific problems, and 
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bears some similarities to what has sometimes been called “cargo-cult sci-
ence,” “junk science,” and simply pseudoscience. Such problematically bad 
science stems from a variety of possible causes, including self-deception (as 
scientists often are oblivious to their biases) and, at the extreme, intentional 
fraud. Scientific findings are supposedly cumulative, such that research 
claims shown to be wrong should ideally be replaced by revised claims. 
However, this does not always work quickly, so even after being debunked, 
flawed work based on voodoo science can continue to spawn publications 
that cite the debunked findings like zombies that still walk the earth, even 
though long dead.
Motive for These Extraordinary Claims
Although we do not want to speculate about any motive for making the 
extraordinary claims of Fredrickson and Losada (2005) regarding the criti-
cal positivity ratio, others have done so. For example, Prichard (2015) com-
mented on the debunking of the ratio, as follows:
While there is no reason to believe the authors intentionally misused the math, 
it became quite apparent that they had no idea what they were doing and neither 
did the peer reviewers or the editors at American Psychologist. Unfortunately 
. . . the rate at which the Fredrickson and Losada paper continues to be cited far 
outpaces the rate at which the rebuttal has been cited. (p. 48)
Similarly, Koepsell (2016) discussed that our article resulted in an uncon-
tested debunking, such that “the ratio is eviscerated, and even Fredrickson 
has now conceded this point,” but she is “still putting a positive spin on things 
and clinging to her thesis, despite the lack of solid evidence” (p. 19), conclud-
ing that Fredrickson and Losada may have fooled themselves, even if this did 
not reach the level to be seen as actual fraud.
The Tension Between Growing Acceptance and Continued 
Resistance
Fortunately, the beginnings of some acceptance of our debunking the critical 
positivity ratio is slowly appearing. In addition, there is now even some 
empirical work demonstrating the absurdity of the claim for this allegedly 
universal–invariant number. For example, Shrira, Bodner, and Palgi (2016) 
showed that the observed ratio changes depending on research participants’ 
ages and the specific measurement approaches used, so the ratio is clearly not 
empirically invariant around 3, as it varies based on at least these two factors. 
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Of course, it varies on many other factors, and again that there is no consen-
sual metric to make emotions comparable in any simplistic way, so the very 
notion on a universal invariant number is absurd.
However, after receiving such a strong “halo effect” vested in its claimed 
scientific legitimacy from its supposed connection to physics and use of non-
linear dynamic systems from mathematics, the critical positivity ratio still 
refuses to die, perhaps exhibiting the opposite of a halo (i.e., a “devil-horned”) 
effect. Its staying power, despite compelling contradictory evidence, is con-
gruent with the underlying cultural belief about applying science to the com-
plexity of individuals and human systems. The widespread belief that such 
complexity can be reduced to a simple universal–invariant law that can be 
quantified precisely reveals a cultural trap prevalent within much of main-
stream science (see Glover & Friedman, 2015), and especially so within psy-
chology’s subdisciplinary culture (Friedman & Glover, 2016). This relates to 
misunderstanding what good science can actually deliver in this regard, as 
opposed to what voodoo science promises through wishful thinking, but can 
never actually deliver. The fact that many researchers and practitioners con-
tinue to cite and use the critical positivity ratio demonstrates that this point is 
often missed, as our debunking was not merely about finding some simple 
errors in calculation, but rather demonstrated that the attempt to find a univer-
sal value to explain such complexity was misguided from start to finish. That 
such voodoo science continues to influence the literature in psychology and 
other scientific disciplines, as well as to influence practices supposedly based 
on science, is disquieting.
Alas, zombie papers continue to appear that argue for an optimum tipping 
point in the form of a critical positivity ratio, showing how hard it is to kill 
the spawn of voodoo science. Indeed, reading a number of recent discus-
sions of the critical positivity ratio in the literature, it sometimes feels to us 
as if some collective decision has been taken to portray the fundamental 
problems in Fredrickson and Losada’s (2005) article as merely minor math-
ematical inaccuracies, at most. Lewis (2015) stated “the statistical analysis 
on which this assertion is made has been questioned (Brown et al., 2013) and 
the debate rages as to the status of the finding” (p. 331), while Boyatzis, 
Rochford, and Taylor (2015) similarly stated that “a recent critique of 
Fredrickson and Losada’s ratio (Brown et al., 2013) has raised a fresh debate 
as to the relative strength of these two affective states” (n.p.), and Cross and 
Pressman (2017) stated only that “the advanced math behind this ratio has 
recently come under scrutiny” (p. 85). However, this is not a matter of con-
tinued debate or simply coming under scrutiny, as the outrageous claim for 
a critical positivity ratio has been shown to be completely wrong, both math-
ematically and empirically.
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As a result of confusion, and possibly obfuscation, about this debunking, 
the scientific literature continues to include abundant numbers of papers ref-
erencing a tipping point around 3, despite the utter lack of evidence for any 
such claim. For example, Terni (2015) stated, “Fredrickson (2009) found that 
a ratio of positive to negative emotions of 3 to 1 or more leads to flourishing, 
a finding that still holds despite recent criticism” (p. 12), while Coulombe, 
Jutras, Labbé, and Jutras (2016) appeared to imply that our only contribution 
had been to correct the possibility that, in cases with just a small amount of 
negative emotions, one’s positivity ratio might become invalid due to need-
ing to divide by zero, but otherwise the critical positivity ratio still holds.
Recanting the Withdrawal of the Mathematics Adds to the 
Cacophony
Even worse, Losada, who coauthored the correction that withdrew the math-
ematical modeling component of the claim for a critical positivity ratio 
(Fredrickson & Losada, 2013), has now changed his mind about his with-
drawal of the mathematics. Indeed, in an article posted on his consulting 
company’s website (Losada, 2014), he continued to argue in support of the 
critical positivity ratio, and his company’s logo on that same website (http://
losadalineconsulting.net/) still depicts the butterfly-shaped Lorenz attractor 
that became an icon of the critical positivity ratio within the popular media. 
In his 2014 recantation of his 2013 withdrawal and his reaffirmation of its 
original mathematics, Losada invoked the names of many luminaries as sup-
porting his original claim for the existence of 2.9013 as a universal–invariant 
tipping point, including mentioning Artur Avila, a recent winner of the pres-
tigious Fields Medal (the equivalent of the Nobel Prize in mathematics), who 
is also from Brazil where Losada’s company is located. We contacted Avila, 
who stated (personal communication, August 25, 2015):
I was never contacted by Losada, and in fact this is the first time I hear of him. 
I browsed the text you sent me and he seems to have no idea about what I 
actually work on. I have not contributed to the theory of Lorenz attractor, and I 
don’t see how my work on universality would apply specifically to this kind of 
dynamics. But in any case, it seems to me that he is just name dropping without 
any understanding of what the mathematical notions he talks about actually 
mean for mathematicians.
We wonder whether, in light of the fact that one of its coauthors clearly no 
longer believes in what he wrote in his withdrawal of the mathematics under-
lying the critical positivity ratio, Fredrickson and Losada’s (2013) correction 
might not now be in need of a correction of its own.
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Implications for Similar Ratios: The Gottman (2015) Ratio
Losada, in redefending his mathematical claims after he had withdrawn them, 
also invoked the name of Gottman (2015) as one of his still-loyal supporters, 
and Gottman is quite well-known for having widely proclaimed his own con-
troversial tipping point of 5 to 1 positive to negative interactions as being 
instrumental to the course of marriages, particularly in delineating and pre-
dicting happy marriages from those ending in divorce. Boyatzis et al. (2015) 
discussed a number of other positivity ratios found in the scientific literature, 
concluding that the controversy about the Fredrickson and Losada (2005) 
critical positivity ratio makes that ratio suspect, but that the validity of the 
Gottman 5-to-1 ratio is not in any question. However, that is not true as 
Shapiro (2015), among many others, provided a cogent criticism of Gottman’s 
(2015) mathematical modeling for first obtaining data and then, after the fact, 
fitting these data to preset variables without first independently replicating 
these findings with new data. Shapiro also cited our work as having “demon-
strated that such modeling is often misapplied and produces errors in conclu-
sions” (n.p.).
Gottman (personal communication to Friedman, April 30, 2015) wrote,
I never understood the math in the Fredrickson and Losada paper and wrote to 
Marcial [Losada] for more explanation and never got a reply. I do predict that 
eventually it will be possible to find that this positive-to-negative ratio will turn 
out to be the eigenvalue of some nonlinear differential equation describing 
general well-being, including happily married couples’ interactions. However, 
so far in our work the 5-to-1 pos–neg ratio during conflict discussions for stable 
happily married heterosexual couples is only an empirical result.
This is the big difference between the claim of Gottman and the original 
claim of Fredrickson and Losada, namely, Gottman only based his ratio on 
data and never claimed a universal–invariant number derived from mathe-
matics. It seems Fredrickson and Losada (2013) retreated to this less outra-
geous position in their withdrawal of the mathematics, at least until Losada 
(2014) reneged on his withdrawal, although his disavowing was not in a peer-
reviewed publication but only on his commercial website in which he has 
financial stake in continuing the myth of the critical positivity ratio.
Regarding the softer claim for a tipping point that is less precise than 
2.9013, the same criticisms we have leveled against the empirical argument 
for Fredrickson’s 3 to 1 rendition of her ratio apply to Gottman’s 5 to 1 ratio 
as well, namely, how can one evaluate emotions, positive or negative, in any 
commensurate way to derive a meaningful ratio? In a marriage, can we com-
pare receiving any number of superficial compliments (i.e., either 3 using 
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Fredrickson’s or 5 using Gottman’s approach) with 1 physically abusive, 
drunken episode to get a good balance leading to a happy relationship? 
Consequently, we think all ratios of this ilk are fatally flawed, but some are 
more flawed than others, as the critical positivity ratio with its strong claim 
for a 2.9013 tipping point is astoundingly flawed.
Seligman Chimes In
Seligman, as one of the founders of the positive psychology movement, lec-
tured extensively about the importance of the critical positivity ratio over 
many years, and even misstated on multiple occasions captured throughout 
the Internet that the alleged finding of 2.9013 was initially based on studies 
within 60 organizations when, in fact, it was based only on studies on 60 
teams within just one organization. He has privately acknowledged this exag-
geration as a mistake, which he tentatively attributed to his misremembering 
a crucial fact and not fact checking his claim (personal communication to 
Friedman on September 5, 2013). However, despite promoting the critical 
positivity ratio as the gem of positive psychology in speeches all over the 
world, after its debunking he claimed,
Has it escaped your notice that none (zero) of the papers that I know who 
followed up Fredrickson took the math or the derivation or the exact number of 
the ratio seriously? And that none that I know of conceived of the ratio as 
“critical?" What the literature took seriously and still stands is that some ratio 
(differing perhaps by context) is likely optimal for some particular functioning. 
(Personal communication to Friedman on September 5, 2013)
Later, after being challenged by Friedman on this assertion, as clearly many 
in positive psychology and more broadly in psychology and other disciplines 
did take this claim quite seriously, Seligman wrote, “But if you think I ever 
endorsed a ‘critical’ or ‘universal’ ratio as opposed to praising Fredrickson’s 
work generally, you are simply wrong” (personal communication to Friedman 
on September 26, 2013). That same day, Friedman responded: “It does seem 
clear to me that you ‘endorsed a critical or universal’ ratio of 3-1 when you 
used that exact ratio in a classroom intervention and cited Fredrickson and 
Losada’s (2005) paper to support its use” (in Seligman, Ernst, Gillham, 
Reivich, & Linkins, 2009). This illustrates how one leader in the positive 
psychology movement has tried to come to terms with the debunking of the 
critical positivity ratio, and that he still holds on to the unfounded belief that 
some optimal emotional ratio will eventually be found, despite the incom-
mensurate nature of emotions.
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Romantic Scientism as an Endemic Problem Within Positive 
Psychology
Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, and Fugelsang (2015) wrote about what 
they called “pseudo-profound bullshit.” This genre of scholarly manure was 
characterized as obfuscating with impenetrably vague verbiage often linked 
with scientific allusions that made it seem profound. In a similar vein, one of 
us has been writing for a long while on reconciling the tension between “sci-
entism” and “romanticism” in doing legitimately good science (Franco, 
Friedman, & Arons, 2008; Friedman, 2002a, 2002b, 2005, 2008, 2015a). 
Romanticism involves among other things naively accepting all sorts of dubi-
ous things that seem pleasing, while scientism involves among other things 
naively accepting all sorts of dubious things that seem scientific but are not. 
We have placed these terms together to address approaches that seem both 
pleasing and scientific by invoking the new term, romantic scientism, to 
describe a combination that involves the worst of both, which is how we 
described the fiasco that is the critical positivity ratio (Brown et al., 2014a).
A number of unnamed adherents to positive psychology challenged us by 
claiming that Fredrickson’s work on the critical positivity ratio was just an 
anomaly. As the avowed best-of-the-best researcher within positive psychol-
ogy, they claimed her other work lives up to her top-notch reputation, so we 
turned our attention to some of that other work. In a recent high-profile paper 
in which she and her coauthors claimed that adhering to eudaimonic (i.e., 
altruistic-based) rather than hedonic (i.e., pleasure-based) happiness led to 
more favorable patterns of gene expression,3 we found that her conclusion 
again was more than problematic (Brown, MacDonald, Samanta, Friedman, 
& Coyne, 2014), and when she and her coauthors published a follow-up 
paper on the same topic that doubled-down on her previous claim, that too we 
found to be severely flawed (Brown, MacDonald, Samanta, Friedman, & 
Coyne, 2016); other authors have also pointed out very substantial problems 
with this work (Nickerson, 2017a; Walker, 2016). Similarly, in another recent 
high-profile paper we examined closely, Fredrickson and her coauthors 
claimed that practicing loving–kindness meditation led to better physiologi-
cal outcomes (as indexed by vagal nerve tone), and yet again we found that 
conclusion untenable (Heathers, Brown, Coyne, & Friedman, 2015). What 
could be more romantically pleasing than making scientific claims that altru-
ism leads to more favorable gene expression, loving kindness meditation 
leads to better physical health, and that there is a universal–invariant ratio 
that can lead to flourishing if only people would just increase their ratio of 
positivity to negativity above the 2.9013 tipping point? And surely, nothing 
bolsters such romantic claims better than alleged scientific facts that claim to 
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be grounded in the discipline of mathematics through using nonlinear 
dynamic systems (and appealing to a famous equation from the discipline of 
physics), as well as focusing on physiological variables and thus appealing to 
the most scientific-appearing area within the discipline of psychology. This 
type of spurious work, coming from the researcher positive psychology has 
lauded as its best of the best, and that has garnered international headlines, is 
precisely why we included the phrase “wishful thinking” in the title of two of 
our articles on debunking the critical positivity ratio—and this shoddy work 
seems not merely anomalous within the subdiscipline but endemic.
Implications for Positive Psychology
This leads us to consider the strong claim that positive psychology replaces 
humanistic psychology by the former providing the scientific rigor that the 
latter lacks. Unfortunately, we surmise that, based on this small sample of 
what has been touted as coming from the best of the best—and is among the 
most impactful research within positive psychology, this subdiscipline has 
not cured, but merely repeated, whatever research problems that humanistic 
psychology might have had with its own romanticism, resulting in what are 
even more egregious problems that we now call romantic scientism. In con-
trast to pseudo-profound bullshit consisting of vague statements that sound 
scientific, romantic scientism could not be more precise, as claims such as 
2.9013 being a universal–invariant tipping point, a number specified to 4 
places beyond the decimal point and which in fact goes on from there, is as 
precise as can possibly be, and yet it is a completely bogus number. When 
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) fired their opening salvo proclaim-
ing the alleged scientific advantages of positive psychology over humanistic 
psychology, they lamented the myriad of therapeutic self-help programs and 
the proliferation of books that lacked a scholarly standard spawned by 
humanistic psychology. If they were secretly even a little bit envious of 
humanistic psychology’s commercial success in these areas, perhaps they 
can now be proud that the critical positivity ratio, and similar bogus research 
findings, has led to numerous dubious applications and self-help books, sig-
nifying that the divide between the two subdisciplines has now undeniably 
collapsed.
Introducing the Articles in the Special Issue
With that stated, we asked a number of psychologists who, like us, are skepti-
cal of some of the more breathtaking claims of positive psychology to reflect 
on the meaning of debunking the critical positivity ratio for both positive and 
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humanistic psychology, especially with some attention to future possible uses 
of nonlinear dynamic systems and similar mathematical approaches. Their 
contributions, which form the bulk of this special issue, are briefly described 
in the following paragraphs. As an overall introductory comment, we want to 
note the importance of not throwing out the proverbial baby with the bathwa-
ter, a metaphor used by Fredrickson (2013b) in discussing our debunking. 
Merely because the mathematics was misapplied in the case of the critical 
positivity ratio does not mean that there are no good uses for nonlinear 
dynamic systems in psychology, including within humanistic psychology.
Grant Rich (2017) argues that a reconciliation between humanistic and 
positive psychology is possible, and that a key component of this will be an 
understanding by those who identify with each subfield of each other’s 
research methods. In particular, he argues that positive psychology, now per-
haps stepping back from the scientistic brink in the wake of the critical posi-
tivity ratio debacle, needs to make more use of qualitative methods. 
Historically, such methods have been looked down on by many psycholo-
gists, who preferred the “objectivity” of quantitative measurements of vari-
ables, often involving experimental manipulations. However, the recent 
“replication crisis” (Earp & Trafimow, 2015; Ioannidis, 2005) affecting many 
subdisciplines of psychology—perhaps most seriously social psychology, 
whose research traditions influence much of the empirical research in posi-
tive psychology—may provide an opportunity for reflection. At one level, 
many experimental paradigms have been called into question, which in turn 
raises doubts about the general validity of such ways of conducting research 
when the goal is to learn about how humans behave in real-world situations. 
At another level, increasing recognition of the limitations of underpowered 
studies (e.g., Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2013) show that the reliable 
identification of effects in laboratory settings typically require larger sample 
sizes than have hitherto been the norm (Button et al., 2013), considerably 
increasing the logistical and financial complexity of such research programs. 
Perhaps qualitative methods, hitherto often thought of as too imprecise or 
inefficient in their use of the researchers’ time, may turn out to be more effi-
cient than was once believed.
Carol Nickerson’s article (2017b) discusses the story of the refutation of 
the critical positivity ratio that has, until now, been focused principally on the 
article in the American Psychologist by Brown et al. (2013). She sees this as 
understandable, as the more unusual aspects of this story (e.g., the limited 
academic background of the lead author or the extraordinary nature of the 
claims that were debunked) have resulted in interesting discussions in the 
popular media (e.g., Anthony, 2014; Rotondaro, 2013; Wagner, 2015), as 
well as within academia (e.g., Pérez-Álvarez, 2016). However, behind the 
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spectacular deterministic assertions about human behavior that were made by 
Fredrickson and Losada (2005), there remains a more prosaic story of every-
day social–psychological research. Nickerson presents a thorough analysis of 
the entire empirical literature of the critical positivity ratio and concludes that 
there is simply no evidence to suggest that any particular value resulting from 
the trivial calculation of the ratio of two numbers, representing in some way 
a person’s positive and negative emotions, is associated with any psychologi-
cal outcomes. Nickerson’s article illustrates how easy it is for psycholo-
gists—especially those who are convinced that they have identified some 
fundamental truth about human nature—to misunderstand the meaning of the 
experimental designs and statistical analyses that they use, to the point where 
almost anything can become seen as “true.” It also raises questions about the 
effectiveness of the peer-review process in detecting flawed logic before 
studies are published. Given the reluctance of “leading” journals to retract, 
issue corrections for, or even accept critical commentaries on clearly errone-
ous articles (e.g., Ritchie, Wiseman, & French, 2012), this is a serious con-
cern, especially since positive psychology, in particular, relies heavily on the 
promotion of its empirical findings via the graduates of Master in Applied 
Positive Psychology (MAPP) courses, which do not always impose a rigor-
ous requirement to follow critical evaluations of published literature.
In her article, Barbara Held (2017) incisively explores the meaning of the 
labels “positive” and “negative,” which positive psychologists apply to emo-
tions, character traits, experiences, and psychological interventions. She 
shows that positive psychology’s a priori definition of these labels entails that 
attempts to demonstrate the effects of positivity empirically are likely to be 
meaningless. This is because positive emotions (such as joy, gratitude, and 
hope) are defined as those that are both (a) pleasant to experience and (b) 
highly likely to produce desirable outcomes in the first place. Thus, Held 
poses a thorny question for positive psychology: Is the experience of 
(hedonic) happiness (positivity, etc.) a component of (eudaimonic) flourish-
ing, or does it cause an independent state of flourishing? Logically, it cannot 
be both. Indeed, Held’s argument suggests that the two principal overarching 
theories of positive psychology, Seligman’s (2011) “PERMA” and 
Fredrickson’s (e.g., 2013a) “Broaden-and-Build,” may turn out to be as fun-
damentally irreconcilable as general relativity and quantum mechanics.
Finally, David Pincus, Adam Kiefer, and Jessica Beyer (2017) argue that 
Fredrickson and Losada’s (2005) misapplication of differential equations 
drawn from fluid mechanics should not obscure the serious work of many 
scholars who use nonlinear dynamic systems as the most parsimonious mod-
els to explain changes in people’s behavior over time. Perhaps the smudged 
baby that needs to be saved from the dirtied bathwater of the critical positivity 
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ratio is not, as Fredrickson (2013b) suggested, the various empirical studies 
that purport to show that some critical relation (whose exact value is no longer 
specified) between the number of positively and negatively valenced phenom-
ena being experienced predicts human flourishing. Instead, Pincus and col-
leagues stress that the most important factor in the production of replicable, 
incremental science is to respect the basic principles of research. If an ade-
quate theoretical background and precise hypotheses are present, the methods 
used will stand or fall on their ability to explain observed reality. In the absence 
of these prerequisites, however, any method will do, especially if the prevail-
ing publishing system rewards the production of “interesting” noise.
Conclusion
Ioannidis (2005) shocked the scientific world when he published a seminal 
article claiming that most research findings are false. Positive psychology has 
staked its reputation on attacking humanistic psychology for its supposed 
scientific inadequacies while touting its superiority in bringing scientific 
rigor into research areas long explored by humanistic psychologists, and our 
debunking work has demonstrated that such pride is premature. The support-
ing work on the critical positivity ratio adds to the litany of false research 
findings, and we believe the progress of science relies on the interplay of 
removing the detritus of false claims, while doing the good science that builds 
solid evidence.
The full impact of the disaster known as the critical positivity ratio has 
still not sufficiently defused throughout the positive psychology community 
or the wider world, but our hope is it will lead to a greater humility within 
adherents to positive psychology, so they might gain more appreciation for 
their own subdiscipline’s limitations by avoiding outrageous claims in the 
future, and also they begin to recognize better the many important contribu-
tions from humanistic psychology that are amply supported by scientific 
research (such as in psychotherapy research; see Friedman, 2016). Such dis-
cernment is sorely needed within positive psychology, and this need is 
slowly beginning to be addressed by more critical approaches to that subdis-
cipline (e.g., Brown, Lomas, & Eiroa-Orosa, 2017). Prior to our debunking 
work, Schneider (2011) used the critical positivity ratio as an example of 
serious conceptual limitations in positive psychology. We have gone beyond 
this to demonstrate that the critical positivity ratio is bunk through and 
through, and that similar reductionistic ratios cannot be defended as any-
thing more than methodological artifacts contingent only on the way mea-
sures are taken. The yearning within positive psychology to find such 
magical ratios is romantically appealing, and bolstering these efforts using 
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scientistic approaches surely amounts to romantic scientism. Schneider 
made an impassioned plea for developing an integrated humanistic–positive 
psychology in which both humanistic and positive psychology might 
get along cooperatively as sibling subdisciplines rather than as competing 
factions, as did Friedman (2008, 2013a, 2013b, 2014) in a number of publi-
cations. The articles in this special issue address this possibility for recon-
ciliation and also show how responsible approaches to using nonlinear 
dynamic systems can be appropriately incorporated into humanistic psy-
chology, as well as how positive psychology can avoid future blunders 
involving advocating for bogus findings such as the critical positivity ratio. 
Science is a self-correcting endeavor, and our hope is that positive psycholo-
gists will see this baby’s smudge (again using the metaphor employed by 
Fredrickson, 2013a) as a learning experience, rather than an affront, as both 
subdisciplines have much good yet to accomplish in the world; but it takes 
humility (Leary et al., 2017), and perhaps even heroic courage (Friedman, 
2017), to honestly admit and learn from painful mistakes.
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Notes
1. See Brown (2014) for a discussion of the extent to which this program, billed by 
its initiators as “training,” is difficult to distinguish from a research undertaking.
2. This term does not refer to Vodun/Vodou as a respected world religion but, rather, 
is used in line with how others have employed this term to describe a type of 
bad science, such as in the infamous title of a prominent paper (Vul, Harris, 
Winkielman, & Pashler, 2009), originally published under the title of “Voodoo 
Correlations in Social Neuroscience,” but later having its title changed at the 
editor’s request to “Puzzlingly high correlations in fMRI studies of emotion, 
personality, and social cognition” post publication (see http://www.edvul.com/ 
voodoocorr.php). Note that some of the discussion here related to voodoo science 
is taken from an unpublished privately circulated newsletter article (Friedman, 
2015b).
3. Specifically, a press release (Wheeler, 2013) promoting this study implied that 
people who score more highly on eudaimonic well-being typically have immune 
systems primed to ward off the viruses they will be catching from their large 
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number of friends, whereas people with a preponderance of hedonic well-being 
have gene expression profiles consistent with fighting off the bacterial infections 
that they are likely to experience due to all the fights they are probably going to 
get into.
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